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The most successful bioprospecting venture was established in 1989 in Costa Rica. Interestingly, the distinction of being 
a forerunner in exploiting bioprospecting goes to India. In 1979, a full decade before Costa Rica, India established the 
Tropical Botanic Garden and Research Institute (TBGRI) at Trivandrum. Yet, the TBGRI venture with the Kani tribes, 
which had the potential to become a beacon of bioprospecting success, is showcased as the exemplar of failure. In this era of 
trade regime, this paper asserts, bioprospecting ventures are important tools for developing countries. Countries like India 
and organizations like TBGRI should learn from their failures and take leadership roles to evolve techniques to maximize 
returns by using biodiversity resources. With this as the background, this paper propounds three theoretical models for 
assigning bio-value to biotechnology products.  
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Those who cannot learn from History are condemned 
to repeat it.1 Those who fail to negotiate are 
condemned by History. 
The biggest achievement of the 20th Century is the 
expansion of the scope of property rights to 
accommodate intangible property, which in turn, 
facilitated a set of remarkable negotiations that altered 
the structure of international trade to facilitate 
globalization.2 Ironically, though, the debate on trade 
and IP rights gained significance not because of the 
trade facilitated but because of the trade distorted 
from matters excluded from intellectual property (IP) 
regime. Harmonized laws, crafted solution to reduce 
international trade distortions, have resulted in 
minimum standards that force maximum levels of 
protection.   
Nevertheless, nations differ on the question of what 
to protect as IP and how to protect IP .3 Partly, the 
differences in the treatment of IP rights are 
attributable to a lack of clarity regarding the subject 
matter eligible for IP protection (as opposed to the 
rights they embody). For instance, protection status 
for certain properties like genetic (biodiversity) 
resources recognized in the non-western parts of the 
globe has at best, remained moot. Developing nations 
have struggled to appreciate refusal by the modern 
western paradigm of property that fervently celebrates 
IP, to treat contributions that enable creation of such 
property, genetic resources, as a part of IP. 
Consequently, this era has also seen a push towards 
global recognition of newer forms of intellectual 
property right (IPR). 
Yet, it is important to remember that developing 
nations have traditionally been suspicious of IP  
and indeed, would likely benefit from moderate  
rather than excessive IP protection. After all, in 
developing nations, like India and Brazil, IP laws 
historically played a limited role. Considering this 
factum, the reason why developing countries want IP 
to embrace genetic resources is unclear. If the goal is 
to create a return for local resources, holders of 
genetic resources do not necessarily require IP as a 
basic tool to structure a return regime for genetic 
resources. Developing nations should, instead, 
formulate innovative, alternative, effective tools that 
protect local resources. The objective of this work is 
to analyse instruments that developing countries  
can successfully use to create returns on local  
biodiversity resources.  
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Of Enablers & the Enabled 
Between prospecting and applying technology, 
importance of biogenetic resources cannot be 
discounted. Technology, development and research 
are also important paradigms, but they are already 
well-recognized aspects of bio-prospecting. It is the 
bio-paradigm that cries of prospecting on the one 
hand and pirating on the other. The following 
discussion examines the bio paradigm of 
biotechnology in an effort to highlight a case for 
creating a value for biodiversity.   
Bio-Prospecting & Biodiversity 
Bio-prospecting involves exploration of 
biodiversity for biological resource.4 Biodiversity is 
explored or prospected to determine whether parts of 
it can be useful to mankind. The term biodiversity 
encompasses, ‘the variability among living organisms 
from all sources including, inter alia , terrestrial, 
marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the 
ecological complexes of which they are part; this 
includes diversity within species, between species and 
of ecosystems’.5 A dozen countries, including Brazil, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Mexico, Zaire, 
Madagascar, Australia, China, India, Indonesia and 
Malaysia, are mega diversity countries ripe for bio-
prospecting.5 These countries account for 60 to 70 
percent of the world’s biodiversity.6 
Modus of Bio-Prospecting 
Bio-prospecting is a three step process. Step one 
involves exploration, extraction and screening of 
biological diversity. Bio-prospectors collect plants 
and other organisms for testing bioactivity in 
exchange for a licensee fee.6 Collection involves the 
process of removing a specimen of identified species 
from its natural surroundings.6 Typically, numerous 
sample collections are identified and examined before 
identifying the right plant or chemical. Once a 
researcher identifies a plant with its medicinal 
properties, the collected plants and organisms are 
processed and their bioactivity tested.7 Step two 
involves experimentation, appreciation of the 
resources and understanding the prevailing traditional 
knowledge over the resources. Step three involves 
using knowledge database over biological diversity 
from research and traditional sources, to create 
commercially valuable genetic and biochemical 
resources.7 On an average, only one in about 10,000 
chemicals derived from the mass screening of plants, 
animals and microbes results in a potentially 
profitable drug. 8 For example, the United States 
National Cancer Institute screened over 35,000 plants 
and organisms for anti-cancer compounds between 
1956 and 1976.9 The programme was terminated in 
1981 due to its failure to identify a greater number of 
new anti-cancer agents.9 Thus, prospecting is a 
rigorous process with no guarantee of successful 
results. 
Issues from Bio-Prospecting 
Protection of biodiversity in the wake of bio-
prospecting raises multifaceted issues that could 
affect several future generations. First, bio-
prospectors assert that they merely scout for natural 
genetic  material4 in the biological resource, which 
should be freely available. Biodiversity holders assert 
that traditional knowledge plays a role in improving 
the success rate for biotechnology by directing 
researchers towards particular chemicals in herbs, 
thus reducing the number of plants screened. The 
problem becomes exacerbated when the ultimate end-
product of the research over the genetic material, is 
protected by IP rights and commercialized. Often, the 
IP rights over the product prevent the local 
communities from accessing it. At that point, local 
communities feel undermined and exploited. 
Second, bio-prospecting is touted as an incentive 
for developing nations to preserve biodiversity while 
enhancing biotechnology.10 The payment made for the 
right to access biodiversity is showcased as the 
incentive for developing countries to preserve their 
flora and fauna.6 Developing countries dismiss the 
argument on the grounds that the payment levels are 
meager, especially when viewed in the light of the 
multi-billion dollar rewards that pharmaceutical 
companies reap.11 Additionally, the payment made to 
the community or the governments in return for 
prospecting rarely results in the community protecting 
biodiversity. 6 Most of these communities are 
impoverished and lack basic facilities like food and 
transportation.12 These communities are rightfully 
more likely to use the money for their community 
development. Furthermore, few countries with natural 
resources have national laws mandating restoration of 
areas depleted by bio-prospecting. For example, 
environmental protection is a Constitutional guarantee 
in India.13 The Directive Principles of the Constitution 
mandates policies to ‘protect and improve 
environment and to safeguard forests and wildlife of 
the country’.14 Despite, separate legislations 
protecting wildlife and forestry,15 until 2000, not a 
single piece of legislation addressed replenishing the 
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flora and fauna lost from bio-prospecting.16 Even the 
Indian Biodiversity Act of 2002 is arguably a 
defensive policy primarily addressed for equitable 
sharing of benefits from bio-prospecting.  
Third, bio-prospecting, being a process of 
extracting valuable chemicals from natural products, 
impacts the bio-equilibrium of the environment 
directly and indirectly. The discovery of chemicals 
with medicinal properties, in particular, varieties of 
plants, reduces the interest in the preservation of 
‘ordinary plants’ for both the bio-prospectors and the 
communities. Consequently, both holder and 
prospector parties prefer cultivating particular plants 
with identified chemicals to reap maximum 
commercial benefits. Any strategic cultivation or 
protection of plants will be targeted to profitable 
varieties. In most cases, other plants, including flora 
and fauna with as yet undiscovered properties, are 
destroyed. The agreement of the TBGRI with the 
Kani tribe in India, for instance, involved cultivation 
of one particular plant in the forest (to which the 
Indian forest department objected on the grounds that 
it could destroy the natural habitat.17 It is perhaps 
impractical to assume that bio -prospecting nations 
and corporate houses using plant extracts to make 
potentially enormous profits will fund cultivation of 
anything other than profit yielding varieties. They are 
rarely concerned about aspects other than access to 
genetic resources. Likewise, ‘access and benefit-
sharing arrangement’ negotiations rarely involve 
preservation of biodiversity destroyed by bio-
prospecting. Unfortunately, biodiversity preservation 
is independent of cancer curing and the other wonder 
plants.6 Ordinary plants and habitats are essential for 
the development of the wonder drugs.6 
Impact of the environment notwithstanding, 
developing countries assert that biotechnology is a 
form of agricultural industrialization that has 
historically destroyed biodiversity by creating 
monocultures divorced from ‘nature,’ with unintended 
consequences such as soil erosion.6,18 Supporters of 
the commercialization theory argue that 
biotechnology enhances agricultural productivity. 19 
The bottom-line is that developing as well as 
developed nations are seduced by the potential 
payoffs from cultivating profit yielding plant 
varieties. Consequently, there is rampant 
commercialization of biodiversity powered by the 
needs and creeds of both the developing and the 
developed nations. Hence, developing countries 
which are interested in exploiting their natural 
resources should carefully determine best practices to 
further commercialization without compromising 
national objectives like biodiversity preservation.  
Asymmetries and Current Trends in Bio -
propsecting Agreements  
Structuring a viable solution for developing nations 
requires an understanding of how the current system 
works along with the benefits and disadvantages 
involved therein. In practice, bio-prospecting 
agreements tend to embody several asymmetrical 
terms. An agreement tends to include asymmetrical 
terms when parties posited in unequally bargaining 
positions negotiate. The asymmetry can result from 
extraneous factors such as poverty of the indigenous 
communities, financial position of the prospector, 
availability of low cost information about the use of 
plants and the communities’ lack of information about 
the profitability of the genetic material. The section 
highlights two types of biodiversity agreements and 
demonstrates the damages that an asymmetrical 
biodiversity agreement can cause. 
Agreements Ignoring Biodiversity 
The first type of bioprospecting agreement pays the 
community but ignores biodiversity preservation 
completely and thus, fails the goals of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity (CBD).5 For example, Shaman 
Pharmaceuticals Inc, an American corporation, collects 
plants for research after gathering information from 
indigenous healers in the rain forests.20 The company 
researches plants used for medicinal purposes by at 
least three different communities.20 Approximately half 
of the plants collected by Shaman's researchers return 
positive results in screening test.21 Shaman 
pharmaceuticals brought two products to clinical trials 
within 24 months from using information about 
tropical medicinal plant species from local people.20 
The agreement between Shaman and the respective 
communities address the needs of the community only. 
The obligation of the community requires them to 
supply information about plants but does not extend to 
preserving biodiversity.20 The agreement is 
commendable for Shaman’s reciprocal arrangement 
with the community, which is done in three stages – 
short, medium and long term arrangements.22 But, 
initiatives like providing infrastructure to the 
community facilitate bioprospector’s access to plants 
without fully creating a procedure for biodiversity 
protection. 
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Agreements Ignoring Community
The second type of agreement funds for 
biodiversity preservation but excludes the community 
that provides knowledge of plant’s medicinal 
properties.9,23 Such agreements ignore the 
communities’ role – after all, the communities’ 
cooperation and knowledge of plants are essential to 
preserve and prevent destruction of biodiversity. Even 
though this type of agreement provides for 
biodiversity preservation, it fails in achieving the 
objective because communities lacking the means for 
daily bread cannot be expected to have the 
commitment to channel scarce resources into 
preserving environment. Furthermore, process of 
prospecting is accelerated by local people’s awareness 
of healing properties of plants which provide clues to 
the possible chemical compounds.24 Agreements that 
ignore community exploit naivety of indigenous 
people to the benefit of the prospectors. They merely 
provide incentives to commercialize biodiversity and 
encourage continuous  supply of chemical-yielding 
plants to the bioprospector.  
The Merck-INBio accord provides a demonstration 
of an agreement prioritizing biodiversity 
preservation.25 Merck, an American pharmaceutical 
company entered into an exclusive agreement with 
INBio of Costa Rica whereby the latter agreed to 
provide chemical extracts from wild plants, insects, 
and microorganisms exclusively for the former’s 
drug-screening programmes.25 Conservation of 
biological diversity is high on the agreement’s 
priorities. The agreement obligates INBio to 
contribute 10% of its upfront payment from Merck 
and 50% of any future royalties to Costa Rica's 
National Park Fund specifically for the purpose of 
conserving biodiversity.26 The primary asymmetry of 
the Merck–InBio agreement is that indigenous 
community of Costa Rica, whose knowledge is 
heavily relied upon, receives very little from the 
agreement. Application of knowledge of indigenous 
societies is absolutely essential to derive maximum 
benefit from biodiversity resources. Yet, indigenous 
communities, who form a vital part of region’s 
geographic diversity, receive secondary treatment.27 
Merck uses locally trained people to locate valuable 
genetic material but unfortunately pays them at local 
rates.  Using low-paid locals to facilitate agreements 
with potential billion dollar payoffs to the 
biopropsector remains an unacceptable feature of 
bioprospecting arrangements.  
Current Trends 
Developing nations that allow bio-prospecting 
should use it to stimulate sustainable development. 
Commitment towards biodiversity preservation and 
local communities is the key to steer such agreements 
towards fulfilling national sustainable development 
goals. Costa Rica serves as a good example of a 
country that uses bio-prospecting to attain sustainable 
development. 
When Merck & Co showed an interest to  
bio-prospect, the government of Costa Rica set-up 
INBio - Instituto Nacional de Biodiversidad. 28 INBio 
is a nonprofit organization formed in 1989 to 
preserve, scientifically classify, and effectively use 
Costa Rica’s biodiversity towards sustainable 
development.29 In establishing INBio and facilitating 
the Merck arrangement, the government of Costa Rica 
has exhibited a remarkable level of dedication 
towards using biodiversity as a means for sustainable 
development. In turn, experience has enhanced the 
confidence, the national government to bargain terms 
that benefit Costa Rica. For instance, INBio 
negotiated a royalty of up to 3% of worldwide sales 
on any drugs developed from the biological samples.30 
The requirement that royalties be paid on worldwide 
sales, rather than just sales in the US or Costa Rica, 
will prevent Costa Ricans from paying royalties on 
products developed from the INBio samples.29 The 
world-wide royalty arrangement would help avoid 
mistrust between the parties at a later stage of the 
agreement. Should a blockbuster drug be developed 
from the INBio samples, the resulting royalty 
payments will greatly benefit Costa Rica.30 In the 
past, Merck had developed successful drugs from 
biological samples like anti-parasitic veterinary drug, 
Ivermectin (developed from a microorganism native 
to Japanese soil)31 which generated $100 million in 
sales in 1991.30  
Another notable term in the agreement requires the 
samples be tested in Costa Rica, in contrast to other 
biopropsecting arrangements where tests are 
conducted at the prospector’s research facilities.25,29 
The local testing provision creates awareness in the 
region about research progress and facilitates 
equitable sharing of royalties. This equitable  
arrangement has fostered an amiable and functioning 
relationship between Merck and INBio, a highlight 
which has been distinctly lacking in other 
bioprospecting arrangements.31
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Under the agreement, Merck is also required to 
establish a research facility and provide funds to 
INBio to supply instruction to native scientists 
and laboratory technicians.25,32 Although Merck has 
invested only about $135,000 in laboratory 
equipment33 and trained about 30 Costa Ricans,31 
INBio has trained locals in parataxonomy to gather 
samples for Merck.31 The parataxonomists are lay 
persons, often from rural areas.29 INBio’s training 
helps them to collect, catalog, and provide data for 
input into INBio’s National Biodiversity Inventory 
and Information Management System. 29 Furthermore, 
INBio retains control of the samples and databases 
which can be used for future negotiations. Thus, the 
government of Costa Rica has taken steps to help the 
local communities. 
The immense confidence that the government of 
Costa Rica gained from its experience went a long 
way in future negotiations. Thus, while renewing the 
agreement in 1994, INBio successfully bargained for 
more research funding, transfer of technology and 
training opportunities for Costa Rican scientists at the 
Merck facility in New Jersey.29 Soon, Costa Rica also 
enacted a Wildlife Conservation law allocating 
responsibilities to specific agencies to negotiate 
strategic bioprospecting agreements to benefit both 
environment and economy.29,33 Additionally, a 
Biodiversity Prospecting Program coordinates high-
end tests at the University of Costa Rica to locate 
compounds for Merck.29  
Unfortunately, not all developing countries even 
should show minimum commitment exhibited by 
Costa Rica towards biodiversity preservation and 
sustainable development. For instance, Brazil’s 
Association for the Sustainable Use of the 
Biodiversity of Amazonia (BIOAMAZONIA) 
negotiated a three-year bioprospecting agreement with 
Novartis pharmaceuticals in return for $4 million and 
a 1% royalty commitment from worldwide sales.29 
Unlike the Merck-INBio, this agreement does not 
require parties to use funds towards biodiversity 
preservation, nor does the agreement provide 
opportunities for Brazilian scientists.29 
India’s effort in bio-prospecting is yet another 
example  of questionable commitment towards 
bioprospecting. The story from India, a mega-
diversity country, involves the Kani tribe of Kerala 
whose knowledge was used to create a drug called 
Jeevani.34 The highpoint of the agreement is to share 
50% of the license and royalties with the tribe.34 The 
low point is that the sharing was done more as a 
charitable gesture in recognition of tribe’s 
contribution without any policy or standardized 
structure for doing the same.34 The shameful aspect of 
the agreement is the low royalty and license fee that 
TBGRI seems to have negotiated with Arya Vaidya 
Pharmacy (AVP), which is a private company. For 
instance, reports suggest that each tribal family earned 
merely about Rs. 8,000 on sale of leaves from the 
cultivation of the T. zeylanicus plant.17 The Indian 
government seems to lack reasonable guidelines for 
such negotiations. For instance, it is unclear whether 
and what component of the royalty is for imparting 
knowledge about the plants (which is the most 
important property transferred in this case) and for the 
sale of the leaves. In fact, reports suggests that there 
was a lack of clarity on what constituted the Kani 
Tribe for a considerable period. 34 Similarly, there 
seems to be no reasonable study to estimate or project 
the drug’s market potential, nationally and 
internationally. There is also no study discussing the 
existing potential AVP to effectively position the drug 
and whether the AVP would need more assistance to 
fully capitalize on ventures in the future. The lack of a 
uniform policy for such ventures reflects poorly on 
the Indian government and the TBGRI.  
The various discussions above go to outline that 
ultimately, developing nations must realize that sus-
tainable development can be achieved while simul-
taneously preserving biological diversity.  Such a 
realization can help countries to strategically use bio-
prospecting agreements to further objectives of CBD. 
Valuation of Bio-Diversity Assets 
The discussions above demonstrate that bio-
prospecting is a by-product of mutual agreement 
between prospector and local communities or the 
government, as the case is. It posits negotiations as 
one key to success in bio-prospecting arrangements. 
Thus, bargaining positions are central to determining 
equities. The prospector seeks biodiversity material in 
order to create biotechnology by-products. By virtue 
of biotechnology assets being eligible for IP 
protection, qualifying by-products of bio-prospecting 
immediately generates a market value. In other words, 
IP protected products automatically embody a certain 
value and goodwill. Value is important because 
property theories tend to be value based. Measured in 
value terms, biodiversity’s value in being the holder 
of the genetic material for use by prospectors cannot 
be discounted. So, the question for developing nations 
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should perhaps not be whether the genetic material is 
an IP. Instead, the question is determining the value in 
genetic materials – or, the bio  value in biotechnology. 
While IP remains one method of generating value, 
countries need to realize that value can be generated 
without IP too.  
Value of any property is ultimately a measure of 
need. Appreciating the extent of need is central to 
generating maximum value over any property, real or 
intellectual. Several so called ‘intellectual properties’ 
suffer in the market because it did not generate 
adequate need in the market. Abandoned trademarks, 
patents that are not renewed are all examples. In such 
cases, although the respective intellectual property 
offices may be arbiters of the existence of property, the 
lack of market need prevented the product from 
realizing its maximum value. Similarly, valuable IPs 
that are not marketed, may also not generate its full 
value. It goes to prove that a property has to be well-
positioned in the market to realize its full value from 
the market need. Hence, merely granting a property 
status or generating a value disconnected with need 
also does not serve the objective of exploiting a 
resource beneficially. Thus, equation requires the 
holder of a property to work towards achieving twin 
goals of generating value and measuring need. The 
reliance of biotechnology over genetic materials creates 
‘need’ and hence, generates a value for the genetic 
materials. It is up to the biodiversity holder to 
maximize upon the value during the course of 
negotiations. The following discussion highlights some 
models over which developing countries can further 
build to maximize the value of biodiversity resources.  
 
Prospect Based Model 
The prospect model provides for two levels of 
compensation. The first level provides for a base 
compensation for access to genetic resources. At this 
stage, need is marginal because complete information 
about the materials is unavailable to the bio-
prospector. The second level of compensation is 
dependent on the market success or failure of the bio-
prospecting venture relative to the extent of 
involvement. The success of this level depends on the 
extent of disclosure requirements that both parties 
agree to make during the course of the agreement. 
Thus, assuming the prospecting results in a drug that 
yields 100% profits (relative to the investment made 
for that particular prospecting operation – which 
would, in essence discount regular employee costs 
that are made generally by the corporation like regular 
employment related costs, etc.,), the bio-value of the 
compound would depend on several factors like 
importance of the bio-diversity resource for creating 
the drug, information imparted by the community, 
extent of effort by the prospector and type of 
information generated, methodology of prospecting 
and technology used for prospecting. 
The prospect model works on the assumption that 
both parties to the bio-prospecting deal are working to 
maximize their financial prospects by exploiting the 
resources beneficially in the market. The model’s 
focus is not what is needed to keep the community  
(or the government, as the case is) happy but on the 
need of biodiversity materials to the prospector. Thus, 
negotiated royalty is independent of the levels of 
economic and/or social development of indigenous 
communities at the time of negotiations. Otherwise, 
bio-prospectors easily satisfy communities by 
building schools, a few roads or throwing community 
development ‘crumbs’ while carefully ensuring that 
billion dollar returns that keep investors happy  
are not disturbed.  
The advantage of the model is that it eliminates 
deficiencies of the current models where only the 
prospector benefits from highest market price if the 
drug is successful. Under the prospect model, the 
negotiated price of the biodiversity can fluctuate 
upward based on the success or the failure of the 
compound.35 By forcing prospecting company to 
provide data on screening programmes, expected 
levels of success in each stage of research and 
information about the on-going research,35 both 
parties would benefit if the drug is successful relative 
to the extent of involvement.  
 
Information Based Model 
A more sophisticated version of the prospect model 
is on the lines proposed by Anthony Artuso. 35 Under 
this model, royalty payment would be streamlined 
depending on the outcomes of each stage of test 
result, thus generating a continuous range of values 
for both parties.35 The prospector would be required 
to initially negotiate based on a prediction of the rate 
of success of the prospecting effort and typology of 
information that may be generated.35 Further tests or 
trials performed over the compound would be like 
purchasing a call option.35 If the results meet the 
expectations, then the increase in need for the 
biodiversity material proportionally increases the 
value of the option to proceed with further research 
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and development increases.35 If the results are 
unsuccessful, value of return diminishes thereby 
affecting the option to go forward.35 The benefit of 
this model is that it forces the ‘researcher to think 
more systematically about the correlation between test 
results of compounds in consecutive phases’.35 
Further, in reassessing the need for biodiversity 
repeatedly, it provides an expected value for the 
compound at every stage of research and 
development. Notably, Artuso highlights that the 
model is focused more on pharmaceutical research 
and development. Perhaps, bio-values can be 
evaluated similarly depending on data like the type of 
research and type of knowledge that quickened a 
particular research phases. 
 
Contract Based Model 
The contract model which can be worked alongside 
the other models essentially recognizes that more 
information would help streamline negotiating 
mechanism. The model works on the assumption that, 
first, developing nations are committed towards 
biodiversity preservation and the local communities. 
Second, in order to fully benefit, developing countries 
should appreciate that bio-prospecting is a rigorous 
and risky process. Considering the risks involved, the 
prospector is usually unable to predict success when 
they enter into bioprospecting agreements. Similarly, 
return to the prospector is not immediate. Therefore, 
biodiversity rich countries are bound to create low-
returns for themselves when they negotiate a total 
return payment at the beginning of prospecting 
venture without any connection to the level of 
success, like how it is currently done. Hence, the need 
for biodiversity holders to negotiate returns that takes 
into account risks and needs at every stage of the 
development process. In essence, this model lends 
information (like, disclosure requirements) that works 
the other models more efficiently by taking account of 
the increased value from the need.  
 
Bio-prospecting agreements should incorporate 
four standard terms. They are: (a) allocation of funds 
towards biodiversity conservation, (b) allocation of 
funds towards community development of the  
locals that provide valuable  information, (c) IP 
sharing/ownership and (d) local manufacturing 
requirement. The first two heads should be negotiated 
in return for the initial access to the genetic resources. 
The success of the initial testing creates a higher value 
(and need) which serves as the basis for the terms 
relating to sharing of IP and incorporating a local 
manufacturing requirement which can result in 
transfer of technology and sustainable development, 
as envisaged in the Article 16-19 of the CBD.With 
respect to IPR, communities can share rights in IPs 
under different heads. IP may also be transferred from 
use of the name as trademark, or as part of 
geographical indicator of the resulting product. 
Communities that provide information about bio-
genetic resources can share relative to the extent of 
their involvement, a portion of worldwide royalties on 
sales or, under some circumstances, become joint 
patent holders. Once the heads for sharing IP are 
determined, communities can structure several 
options to generate returns. Thus, communities can 
seek specific infrastructural changes, or stagger 
royalty percentage with sales. That is, developing 
country would become eligible for ‘x%’ of royalty 
over the first 50 million dollars of sales and ‘y%’ over 
the next 50 million dollars of sales. Thus, it is 
important to create a mechanism to continually 
generate the value from need. The resulting 
information will result in awareness and lead to 
discussions within indigenous communities, which 
can ultimately translate into beneficial negotiations.  
 
Similarly, with respect to the local working 
requirement, biodiversity resources can be 
strategically exploited to attract foreign direct 
investments. Thus, bio-prospecting agreements can 
include a training component or include a provision to 
funds for training local scientists and/or to set up local 
manufacturing or research facilities. After all, 
developing countries became signatories of the trade 
agenda in the expectation of foreign direct 
investment. Including a local manufacturing 
requirement in bio-prospecting agreements would 
reduce the adverse effects developing countries suffer 
from national treatment TRIPS which forbids 
discrimination on the basis of place of manufacture.36 
In order for the model to work more efficiently, the 
Governing Body of the CBD should assume a more 
active role in encouraging such agreements. The 
Governing Body of the CBD can constitute an 
advisory body - An Expert Advisory Committee 
(EAC) - to assist developing countries at different 
levels of the biodiversity pyramid to negotiate 
favorable bioprospecting agreements. Such a body 
can assist member states in their expert capacity 
regarding the bio-prospecting negotiations in the 
following manner37:  
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(a) EAC can issue advisory opinions to member 
states regarding bio-prospecting negotiations. 
The advisory opinions can highlight different 
terms that developing countries should include 
in the negotiations. It can also outline various 
options to structure royalty terms. Negotiating a 
bio-prospecting agreement is difficult because 
biodiversity resources do not fall within clear 
ownership of any one person or group in 
particular.38 The advisory body can be helpful in 
highlighting various options to negotiators, be it 
the government representatives or community 
representatives and to understand the 
ramifications of bio-prospecting arrangements.38  
(b) EAC can provide guidelines as part of its duty to 
help developing countries appreciate the issues 
that might be involved in such negotiations. The 
Bonn Guidelines, for instance, serve as a useful 
tool for members to legislate national laws on 
Access and Benefit Sharing.37 Similarly, 
guidelines can be issued on various aspects like 
sharing IP, creating local working and 
determining the extent of community 
involvement.  
 
The EAC’s work in itself can create a library of 
information, drawing lessons from steps that other 
countries have taken steps to facilitate fair exchange 
of genetic and technological resources.  
 
Conclusion 
It is economically unfeasible for developed 
countries and the big pharmaceutical companies to 
demand low-cost access to biodiversity and respect 
for IPR from developing nations. Respecting local 
rights can be the first step to nurture respect for IPR. 
Developing countries should ensure that the trilogy of 
objectives - protection of biodiversity, sustainable 
development, and equitable sharing of resources - 
work in tandem with trade objectives.  
 
References  
1 Santayana George, The Life of Reason, 1 (1905). 
2 Wooldridge Adrian, The Battle for Brainpower, The 
Economist, 5 Oct 2006, http://www.economist.com/surveys/ 
PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=7961894. 
3 The differences in the treatment of intellectual properties are 
usually owed to prioritizing other worthy objectives such as 
elimination of poverty and unemployment, esp ecially by 
countries at lower levels of economic development. The 
United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund, and 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
use divergent standards (per capita income, poverty level, 
and infrastruct ure development, respectively) to determine 
the levels of national development. 
4 Pan Peter G, Bioprospecting: issues and policy 
considerations, Honolulu HI: Legislative Reference  
Bureau, http://www.oha.org/pdf/bioprospecting/legs/ 
Peter_G_Pan.pdf. 
5 Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 June 1992, 31 I.L.M. 
818 (1992) [CBD]. 
6 Chen Jim, Diversity and Deadlock: Transcending 
Conventional Wisdom on the Relationship Between 
Biological Diversity and Intellectual Property, 
Environmental Law Reporter, 31 (10) (2001) 625, 629. 
7 Bioactivity is the process of testing for either chemical 
properties or activities from biological materials, See The 
Latin American Alliance, Bioprospecting/Biopiracy And 
Indigenous Peoples (19 September 2001), 
http://www.kahea.org/gmo/pdf/bioprospecting_people.pdf. 
8 Evans Illidge E A and Murphy P T, A New Approach to 
Benefit Sharing in Bioprospecting, http://www.undp.org/ 
bpsp/thematic_links/access.htm (20 Novovenber 2006). 
9 Bioprospecting/Biopiracy and Indigenous Peoples (June 
2005) http://www.kahea.org/gmo/pdf/bioprospecting_people. 
pdf; Ragavan Srividhya,  Biodiversity-A North/South Issue: 
An Indian Perspective, Presentation at the CASRIP High 
Technology Summit, Seattle, Washington (24 June 2000).  
10 Manfield Marla E, Protection of Global Biodiversity: 
Converging Strategies , Colmbo Journal of Intellectual 
Environmental Law & Policy, 10 (1999) 143, 147 (book 
review); Sharma Ajay, The global loss of biodiversity: A 
perspective in the context of the controversy over intellectual 
property rights, University of Baltimore Intellectual Property 
Journal, 4 (1) (1995) 26-284.  
11 Kaddial Shayana, Plants, poverty, and pharmaceutical 
patents, Yale Law Journal,  103 (1993) 223, 224, discussing 
about anti-cancer drugs vincristine and vinblastine which 
were developed from the rosy periwinkle. The drug resulting 
in annual sales of around $100 million for Eli Lilly, while the 
Madagascar region, where the plant was found derived little 
benefit from the plant. 
12 Ragavan Srividhya, Protection of traditional knowledge ,  
Minnesota Intellectual Property Law Review , 2 (2) (2001)  5. 
13 Constitution of India, (INDIA) (1950), Directive Principles of 
State Policy, Part IV Article 48A. 
14 Constitution of India, (INDIA) (1950), Directive Principles of 
State Policy, Part IV Article 48A. 
Protection and improvement of environment and 
safeguarding of forests and wild life - The State shall 
endeavor to protect and improve the environment and to 
safeguard the forests and wild life of the country. 
PART IVA, Article 51A discussing the Fundamental Duties 
details that: 
It shall be the duty of every citizen of India,...(g) to protect 
and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, 
rivers and wild life, and to have compassion for living 
creatures. 
15 In India several legislations govern protection of forests and 
wildlife including the Indian Forest Act, 1927, The Indian 
Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, The Wild Life Protection 
J INTELLEC PROP RIGHTS, SEPTEMBER 2008 
 
 
522 
Act, 1972, The Wild Life (Stock Declaration) Rules, 1973, 
The Wild Life (Specified Plants - Conditions for Possession 
by Licensee), 1995. 
16 Biological Diversity Bill, (2000) (India). FAQs on the 
National Biological Diversity Act, 2002, National 
Biodiversity Authority of India highlighting that “India 
Forest Act and Forest (Conservation) Act deal with 
management of forests and conservation of forestland 
respectively. Wildlife (Protection) Act deals with protection 
of wild animals, birds and plants, and basically aims at 
protecting, propagating or developing wildlife or its  
environs through national parks, sanctuaries etc”, 
http://www.nbaindia.org/faq.htm. 
17 Agarwal D P, The Jeevani Elixir of the Kani Tribes of Kerala 
and their Intellectual Property (IP) Rights, History of Indian 
Science and Technology Series , http://www.indianscience.  
org/essays/t_es_agraw_jeevani.shtml. 
18 Jackson Laura L, Agricultural Industrialization and the Loss 
of Biodiversity, in Protection of Global Biodiversity: 
Converging Strategies (1998). The reviewers quote the 
perspective that questions the ability of biotechnology to 
preserve biodiversity. 
19 Horsch Robert and Fraley Robert, Biotechnology Can Help 
Reduce the Loss of Biodiversity, in Protection of Global 
Biodiversity: Converging Strategies  (1998). The reviewers 
discuss the essay analysing whether biotechnology can 
effectively be used to preserve biodiversity. 
20 Bierer Donald E, Carlson Thomas J and King Steven R, 
Shaman pharmaceuticals: Integrating indigenous  
knowledge, tropical medicinal plants, medicine, modern 
science and reciprocity into a novel drug discovery 
Approach, http:// www.netsci.org/Science/Special/  
feature11.html (19 Feb. 2001). 
21 Bell Janet, Bio Piracy’s latest disguises, 
http://www.grain.org/publications/jun971-en.cfm. 
22 King Steven R & Carlson Thomas J, Biocultural diversity, 
biomedicine and ethnobotany: The experience of Shaman 
pharmaceuticals, INTERCIENCIA 20 (3) 134-139, 
http://www.interciencia.org/v20_03/art03/index.html. 
23 Ragavan Srividhya, The Global South as the key to 
Biodiversity and Biotechnology -A reply to Professor Chen, 
Environmental Law Reporter, 32 (2002) 10358, 10360. 
24 Saving what remains (12 May 2003) 
http://www.mongabay.com/1007.htm (discussing that 
scientists have found that 86 percent of the plants used by 
Samoan healers displayed significant biological activity 
when tested in the laboratory). Crude extracts of plants used 
by one healer in Belize, gave rise to four times as many 
positive results in lab tests for anti-HIV activity than did 
specimens collected randomly. 
25 Spier Victoria E, Finders' Keepers: The dispute between 
developed and developing countries over ownership of 
property rights in genetic material, Winder Law Symp 
Journal, 7 (2001) 203-220, 221 (discussing a three-step 
conservation program established by the Costa Rican 
Government). 
26 Knos Michele Zebich,Preserving Biodiversity in Costa Rica: 
The Case of the Merck-INBio Agreement, Journal of 
Environment & Development, 6 (2) (1997) 181-82 
(highlighting that a “portion of revenues acquired from 
INBio’s biological prospecting agreements goes to Costa 
Rica’s conservation areas. Ministry of Natural Resources, 
Energy and Mines receives 10% of such revenues and 50% 
of any royalties received from biodiversity prospecting 
agreements and, in turn, funds conservation areas like 
include national parks and reserves. INBio contributed 10% 
of the U.S. $1 million earned from the Merck-INBio 
agreement to the Island of Coco). 
27 The Canadian Arctic, Anxiously Watching a Different 
World, Economist, 24 May 2007, www.economist.com,   
(highlighting how the debate on climate has eroded the 
debate on people).  
28 Merck-InBio Plant Agreement, http://www.american.edu/ 
ted/MERCK.HTM  (May 2002) (discussing that biological 
resources are diminishing at rates faster than scientists can 
identify new species.   Of the known species 5 to 30 million 
species, only 1.4 million have been cataloged and little is 
known about ecosystem diversity, which describes the 
variety of habitats, biotic communities and ecological 
processes found in the biosphere). 
29 Michele Zebich-Knos, Preserving Biodiversity in Costa Rica: 
The Case of the Merck-INBio Agreement, Journal of 
Environment & Development, 6 (2) (1997) 181-82. 
30 Coughlin, Jr Michael D, Using the Merck-INBio Agreement 
to clarify the Convention on Biological Diversity, Columbia 
Journal of International Law, 31 (1993) 337, 356, 
www.ciesin.columbia.edu/docs/008-129/008-129.html.  
31 Merck-INBio Plant Agreement (MERCK), 
http://www.american.edu/ted/MERCK.HTM . 
32 Powers Michelle A, Comment, the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Biological Diversity: Will biodiversity 
preservation be enhanced through its provisions concerning 
biotechnology intellectual property rights?  Wisconsin 
Intellectual Law Journal, 12 (1993) 103, 121. 
33 McClelland Lynn, Bioprospecting: Market -based solutions to 
biopiracy, UCLA Journal of Law & Technology,  
8 (1) (2004), http://www.lawtechjournal.com/notes/2004/ 
08_040809_mccelland.php#FN_23. 
34 Keepers of the knowledge: Towards evolving a framework 
for benefit sharing, http://envfor.nic.in/divisions/ic/wssd/ 
doc3/chapter6/css/Chapter6.htm.  
35 Artuso Antony, Evaluating Host Country and International 
Policy Options for BioChemical Prospecting biodiversity, 
biotechnology and sustainable development in health and 
agriculture: emerging connections, Scientific Publication N. 
560 (1996) p. 176-177.  
36 Annex IC to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
Uruguay Round, World Trade Organization, done at 
Marrakech, 15 April 1994, 33 I.L.M  1981 (1994), reprinted 
in World Trade Organization, the results of the Uruguay 
round of multilateral trade negotiations  365 (1995) at  
Article 7. 
37 The Bonn Guidelines, for instance, serve as a useful tool for 
members to legislate national laws on access and benefit 
sharing. Bonn Guidelines on access to genetic resources and 
fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of their 
utilization, UNEP/CBD/COP/6/24 (Apr. 2002), http:// 
www.biodiv.org/decisions/def ault.aspx?m=cop-06&d=24. 
38 Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, 
Integrating IP Rights & Development Policy, 83, September 
2002, http://www.iprcommission.org/graphic/documents/ 
final_report.htm. 
